Mr. Coordinator, Ambassador Thoeni,
India congratulates you on assuming the role of Coordinator of Subsidiary Body 2. We look forward to working under your guidance today and hopefully next year.
We would like to take this opportunity to make some brief remarks to set out India’s position on important issues at hand under this subsidiary body.
Mr. Coordinator,
Nuclear weapons pose the gravest danger to humanity. The best assurance against their use or threat of use is their complete elimination. India remains firmly committed to the goal of universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. We have called for a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament, as also outlined in our Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament CD/1816, submitted in 2007 to the Conference.
Mr. Coordinator,
Pending their elimination, measures to reduce nuclear dangers arising from accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and increasing restraint on the use of nuclear weapons is pertinent. India has, therefore, called for an agreed multilateral framework that would bring together all states possessing nuclear weapons to discuss measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies.
As part of our doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, India has espoused the policy of “No First Use” against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states.
We are prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.
Mr. Coordinator,
Without prejudice to the priority that India attaches to nuclear disarmament, we call for immediate commencement of negotiations in the Subsidiary body 2 on a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) based on CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.
India, as a nuclear-weapon State and a responsible member of the international community, will approach FMCT negotiations with the utmost commitment.
The UNGA resolution 48/75L, adopted by consensus in 1993, envisaged FMCT as a significant contribution to non-proliferation in all its aspects. India co-sponsored this resolution and has supported all subsequent FMCT resolutions in the UNGA. The mandate for the proposed treaty was explicitly reflected in this resolution and reconfirmed by the Shannon Report in CD/1299 i.e. to “negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
FMCT must be a treaty for banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. FMCT, in our view, is essentially about capping the future production of fissile material for weapon purposes.
The obligations and responsibilities arising from the treaty must apply in a non-discriminatory manner. The treaty should be global in character. An FMCT is not a regional arms control treaty.
FMCT should allow production of fissile material for permitted purposes, taking into account fuel for civil nuclear energy without prejudice to the variety of fuel cycles currently in use or envisaged for the future. Permitted purposes should also include non-proscribed activities such as production and use of fuel for naval propulsion.
FMCT will strengthen the global non-proliferation regime by fostering a measure of strategic predictability and a baseline for future global nuclear disarmament efforts. It is essential that all relevant countries participate in these negotiations in the CD and contribute to its successful outcome.
India has actively participated in relevant forums on this subject, including the GGE and HLEPG on FMCT established pursuant to the GA resolution 67/53 and 71/259 respectively and acknowledges their reports A/70/81 and A/73/159 adopted by consensus. The reports underlined that the Treaty and its negotiation in the CD remains a priority for the international community, and that the CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein remains the most suitable basis on which future negotiations should commence.
India underlines that a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, cannot be a substitute for an FMCT. Moratorium by its very nature is voluntary, reversible, and not verifiable.
I thank you, Mr. Coordinator.