Statement by Commodore Nitin Parvataneni, Director (Military Affairs), Ministry of External Affairs, India at the OEWG on Conventional Ammunition, New York, 6 June 2023

Thank you chair. With regard to the objective itself, we fully support Australia and US views that one of the main focus areas of preliminary actions, prior to any considerations of transfer, is risk assessment. Therefore, we propose that the term comprehensive diversion risk assessments be retained in the title of the objective.

With regard to 8 (a) (iv), we have expressed our views unequivocally in the previous substantive sessions as well. We support the distinguished delegate from China regarding addition of unauthorizednon state actors.However, in the intent of a compromise, we are willing to consider the views of some delegations that have put forth “unauthorized recipients”as a more inclusive term. We as a delegation would be flexible in both these terms whether it is non-state actors or unauthorized recipients. However, please note that the preambular paragraph already states that the whole aim of this framework would be to prevent diversion of conventional ammunition to unauthorized recipients. So, the question really is - would we like to reiterate it here? If so, we would support “unauthorizednon-state recipient” or “unauthorized recipient”. However, we do not support the term unauthorizedState recipient in this draft which is an addition over the terms in the previous draft.

With regard to 8 (a) (v), we as a delegation do not concur with‘unacceptably high riskof diversion’. That is because we do not understand what is ‘acceptable high risk of diversion’. And therefore, we propose that the terms for consideration be either ‘high risk of diversion’ or ‘unacceptable risk of diversion’, because we do understand that, despite our best attempts to eradicate it,there always exists a potentialrisk of diversion.

With regard to 8 (b) (iii) (a), while we support the term ‘end user’, we find it difficult to understand how it would be possible to forecast the end use and therefore, we would support Russia’s views here that we could delete ‘end use’from that sentence. We understand that, in effect, what really matters is the end use of the ammunition irrespective of whether the end user is authorized or unauthorized. But for the purpose of this frame work, we feel it is more appropriate to consider the end user certificate rather than attempt to predict specifically what the end use would be.

And finally, we are very encouraged to note that 8 (b) (iv) refers to voluntary agreements and refers to joint IATG risk reduction processes. Here, we would like to assuage the fears and apprehensions of the distinguished delegations from Jordan and Syria. Risk assessment may not be as vague a term as they proposed it could be. If you could refer to IATG article 02.10, the whole article is an ‘introduction to risk management principles and processes’.  It has numerousrisk relevant chapters namely risk assessment, risk management, risk analysis, risk and ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicalevaluations- which is essentially weighing a risk against trouble, time and money needed to control it),risk reduction, risk acceptance and risk communication.

As a delegation, we have been emphasizing and reiterating at every session that there is a need to incorporate ‘understanding, refinement and global acceptance of the IATG’ in the framework. Therefore, we are happy to note that there are multiple references to it in the current draft. We would urge this esteemed Group to consider promulgation of IATG as a universal guideline document- a step that could go a long way towards a common and shared understanding of the concepts and measures required to prevent unplanned explosions and reduce diversion risk – both being  common objectives  between the IATGand this framework that we are all working so hard to formulate.

 We thank you for your patience and consideration