Statement by Ms Rachita Bhandari, Counsellor (D) during the meeting of the Subsidiary Body 2 on the Verification of an FMCT on June 28, 2018
CD Subsidiary Body 2 on
“Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, with general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices”
June 28, 2018
Statement by India
on Verification
Mr. Coordinator,
Verification will be an important element of the treaty's architecture. Its basic objective will be to ensure that all future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices has ended. Verification would be essential to provide the necessary assurance regarding compliance by all States Parties with the treaty's provisions.
2. A verification mechanism will serve the dual purposes of detection and deterrence against non-compliance and spurious allegations of non-compliance. Production for prohibited purposes, diversion as well as transfers for prohibited purposes would be covered. The number of facilities to be verified will depend on the scope and objective of the eventual FMCT and the costs involved. Enrichment and reprocessing facilities will have to be verified but there may be need for monitoring additional facilities, particularly upstream facilities, for additional confidence. Certain developments, particularly concerns related to some nuclear fuel cycle activities, reinforce this need. Naval propulsion would need to be covered appropriately. Since not all Nuclear Weapons States have separated their civil and military facilities, verification of undeclared facilities may pose specific difficulties.
3. Verification should focus on material from the point of production, wherever it is placed in the nuclear fuel cycle and move forward with material accountancy and channelization in the manner of a pursuit clause. This would cover all possible pathways. This should address various elements of risk involved without undermining the non-discriminatory nature of the treaty or the conceptual and functional integrity of the verification regime.
4. The verification architecture and its components would have to strike a balance between effectiveness, cost as well as acceptability in the light of concerns with regard to national security and/or proliferation as also protection of national confidential information.
5. Verification will flow naturally from the object and purpose of the treaty. As presaged by the Shannon Mandate, this relates to a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This is different from the rationale for IAEA safeguards which aim at ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear material by applying safeguards to declared material for detecting and deterring diversion to potential military use (in the case of NNWS) or actual military use (in the case of voluntary offers/Infcirc 66 types). In fact, the very rationale for an FMCT is that States with unsafeguarded facilities are not willing to apply safeguards and /or the Additional Protocol. Of course, the IAEA experience toolbox will have relevance and value for an FMCT but there can be no direct superimposition. A common agreed verification standard would have to be decided during the treaty negotiations; a standard that is credible, cost effective and acceptable and that fits the purpose of the treaty. This does not imply undermining or diluting any other verification standard.
6. In our view, there would be merit in establishing a treaty based separate, independent and self-contained FMCTO that is self-sufficient in legal authority and financial and human resources capable of supporting effective implementation of the treaty. The relationship between the treaty’s obligations and its implementation including verification should be addressed as an integral whole in the treaty so that the States parties have a sense of ownership and to ensure that the treaty is implemented in a credible and effective manner on a non-discriminatory basis. An FMCTO could enter into cooperation agreements with other international organisations including with the IAEA for cooperation in specific areas identified in the treaty. An FMCTO would be separate from and not subordinate to the IAEA. Along lines of the OPCW, an FMCTO could have a DG and Secretariat which has both technical functions including verification, as well as other support functions.
I thank you, Mr Co-ordinator.
